EU Sanctions on Russia: A Controversial Compromise
What Happened?
On 22 September 2026, the Council of the European Union agreed to renew sanctions against individuals and entities deemed responsible for undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.1 The renewal extended the sanctions for 36 months instead of the usual six, but three individuals and one entity were removed from the list following pressure from Luxembourg, France, and Slovakia. Two individuals were soon identified as Uzbek-Russian oligarch Alisher Usmanov and Russian-Israeli oligarch Mikhail Fridman. The decision immediately caused controversy within the Union, with Latvia initially vetoing the agreement before ultimately abstaining.
Meanwhile, the EU has continued to expand its sanctions against Russia. On 12 October 2026, the Council approved 1,569 new listings targeting Russia’s military-industrial complex.2 Yet while this expansion increases pressure on Russia, the removal of Usmanov and Fridman exposes tensions between EU common goals and national interests.
How the EU’s Sanctions System Works
EU sanctions are an important instrument of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). They allow the Union to exert economic and political pressure without direct military force, aiming to deter further Russian aggression and discourage further violations of international law.3
Sanctions, like other decisions under the CFSP, generally require unanimity, giving every Member State the power to block a decision it considers unacceptable. Although this ensures that foreign policy decisions have the support of all Member States, it also gives individual governments considerable leverage over policies intended to represent the Union as a whole. The recent delistings of Usmanov and Fridman illustrates this tension.
The sanctions list currently includes more than 4,600 individuals and entities accused of supporting Russia amidst its war against Ukraine. Following the latest renewal, the sanctions will remain in place until 22 September 2029 and include travel restrictions for listed individuals and a prohibition on making funds available to sanctioned subjects.1
EU sanctions are therefore critical not only because of their economic and political consequences, but because they represent the Union’s ability to maintain a unified stance towards the aggressor. The latest renewal, however, has shown how fragile that unity can become when Member States’ national interests come into conflict with the EU’s foreign policy objectives.
The Controversy Behind the Delistings
The removal of Usmanov and Fridman became controversial not simply because of the individuals involved, but because of the different national interests that appeared to shape the decision.
France attracted particular attention after advocating Usmanov’s delisting, citing “an issue of national security” without publicly providing a detailed explanation. The Financial Times subsequently reported that France’s position was connected to a privately negotiated effort involving Azerbaijan and the release of two French prisoners.4
This prompted tensions among the Member States, with some questioning whether a bilateral diplomatic interest should influence the EU’s collective sanctions policy. More importantly, if national priorities can determine who remains sanctioned, the credibility of a common approach becomes difficult to maintain.
Slovakia added another obstacle. Its government, led by Kremlin-aligned Robert Fico, had already pushed for the removal of both oligarchs and vetoed the continued listing of Fridman.5
Luxembourg then expressed its concerns over Fridman’s continued listing. According to media reports, Mikhail Fridman is suing Luxembourg for 16 billion dollars over the alleged illegal freezing of his assets following the EU sanctions in 2022.4 Luxembourg argued that removing Usmanov without clear legal reasoning could strengthen Fridman’s claim that he, too, should be delisted.4 The potential financial consequences of the lawsuit may also have influenced its position. As a result, Luxembourg succeeded, with the EU lifting Fridman’s asset freeze and travel ban.
The controversy became even more complicated when leaked recordings emerged earlier this year involving Hungary's Foreign Minister at the time, Péter Szijjártó, and Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, during Council of the EU meetings. The recordings reportedly showed Lavrov pushing for Usmanov’s and Fridman’s delisting, while Szijjártó also pledged to secure Slovak support.6
Although these revelations should be treated with appropriate caution, they add another layer to the controversy. Coming amid Slovakia’s efforts to remove the two oligarchs, they raise questions about the extent to which Russia itself was seeking their delisting. These developments show how a decision intended to represent a common EU position can quickly become entangled with individual Member States’ interests and political pressure.
The Baltic Position on the Sanctions
The Baltic states have taken a notably critical position towards the delistings, reflecting their assessment of Russia’s aggression as a direct security threat.
Latvia initially objected, arguing that it was not the right time to ease pressure on Russia.7 However, it ultimately abstained, fearing that maintaining its veto could prevent the renewal of the sanctions altogether. As one EU diplomat explained: “No one is happy about this. But the consensus (…) is that it's better to maintain the rest of the listings (...) and make sure we don't have to do this circus again any time soon.”7
Latvia was therefore forced to choose between blocking the entire renewal and accepting the removal of individuals it believed should remain sanctioned. This again reinforces concerns about the effectiveness of unanimity in EU foreign and security policy.
The Baltic states did not, however, accept the outcome without resistance. Latvia subsequently imposed national sanctions on both oligarchs. Lithuania followed on 25 September with five-year national sanctions against Usmanov and Fridman,8 while Estonia approved its own decree on 24 September.9
The Baltic states accepted the EU compromise, not the decision behind it. Formal EU unity thus does not necessarily imply that Member States share the same assessment of Russia’s threat or the appropriate response to it.
Effects and Implications
The renewal of sanctions for 36 months instead of the usual six could signal a stronger long-term commitment to containing Russian aggression. However, removing previously sanctioned oligarchs risks setting a troublesome precedent. If individual Member States can secure delistings by prioritizing their own interests, future sanctions decisions may become vulnerable to political pressure.
Ukraine’s response reflected this concern. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy thanked Latvia for its stance and urged the EU to keep the oligarchs sanctioned, arguing that “No name on the sanctions list is there by accident: each one represents a reason why this war started and continues to this day.”10 Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha similarly criticized the decision, warning that Moscow was benefiting from a perceived sense of impunity and division among Europeans.10
The latest developments also raise questions about the consistency of the Union’s broader security approach. Disagreements over the 21st EU sanctions packet in July and the subsequent delistings have placed unanimity under renewed scrutiny. Although the EU approved 1,569 additional listings on 12 October,2 it can still struggle to agree on who should remain sanctioned. This inconsistency raises concerns about the influence of national interests and the credibility of the EU’s message to Moscow. After all, sanctions are meant to demonstrate a united front, but how convincing is that message when Member States cannot agree on who belongs on the list?
For the Baltic region and Europe’s eastern flank, these divisions are particularly significant. The Baltic states view Russia’s aggression as a direct and enduring security threat, making any perceived relaxation of sanctions especially sensitive. If the EU struggles to maintain a consistent position on Russia, doubts may also emerge about the sustainability of a coordinated Western approach and the Union’s ability to respond collectively to future security challenges.
The credibility of sanctions depends not only on their economic impact but also on whether the states imposing them are willing and able to maintain them consistently. The EU may have achieved three years of sanctions, but whether it has achieved three years of solidarity is a different question.
If European governments cannot agree on who should remain under sanctions over Russia’s war, can the EU realistically be expected to maintain a united position when faced with a greater security challenge?
1 Council of the European Union. “Ukraine's Territorial Integrity: EU Extends Individual Listings for Three Years.” Press release, September 22, 2026.
2 Council of the European Union. “Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: EU agrees largest-ever package of listings targeting almost 1600 individuals and entities in Russia’s military-industrial complex.” Press release, October 12, 2026.
3 Council of the European Union. “How the EU Adopts and Reviews Sanctions.” Accessed September 30, 2026.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-adoption-review-procedure/
4 Tamma, Paola, and Henry Foy. “EU to Lift Sanctions on Two Russian Oligarchs.” Financial Times, September 22, 2026.
https://www.ft.com/content/760091dd-20be-4152-aa0d-561475a99ee8?syn-25a6b1a6=1
5 Moller-Nielsen, Thomas. “France and Slovakia Seek Delisting Russian Oligarchs from EU Sanctions.” The Rapporteur, September 21, 2026.
https://www.rapporteur.com/news/france-and-slovakia-seek-delisting-russian-oligarchs-from-eu-sanctions/
6 Tóda, Mirek, and Weissová, Soňa. “Leaked Phone Call Reveals How Orbán’s Hungary and Fico’s Slovakia Helped Russian oligarchs.” EUobserver, March 31, 2026.
https://euobserver.com/209226/leaked-phone-call-reveals-how-orbans-hungary-and-ficos-slovakia-helped-russian-oligarchs/
7 Liboreiro, Jorge. “EU Renews Russia Sanctions but Removes Usmanov at France’s Request.” Euronews, September 22, 2026.
https://www.euronews.com/2026/09/22/eu-renews-russia-sanctions-but-removes-usmanov-at-frances-request
8 Verslo Žinios. “Lietuva pradėjo taikyti sankcijas rusų oligarchams A. Usmanovui ir M. Fridmanui.” September 28, 2026.
https://www.vz.lt/verslo-aplinka/2026/09/28/lietuva-pradejo-taikyti-sankcijas-rusu-oligarchams-a-usmanovui-ir-m-fridmanui-590623
9 ERR News. “Estonia Imposes Own Sanctions on Delisted Russian Oligarch Pair.” September 24, 2026.
https://news.err.ee/1610146513/estonia-imposes-own-sanctions-on-delisted-russian-oligarch-pair
10 Rankin, Jennifer. “EU Removes Two Oligarchs from Russia Sanctions List as Deadline Looms.” The Guardian, September 22, 2026.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/22/eu-removes-oligarchs-from-russia-sanctions-list-as-deadline-looms
