The Stakes in Ankara

On July 7th to July 8th, the 2026 NATO Summit will take place in Ankara, Turkey. Member states will gather to discuss the improvements made since last year's summit, as well as some of the most pressing issues continuing to impact the alliance and global governance. Due to the withstanding necessity of deterrence and security in Europe, the alliance at large is set to focus on progress in defense spending and procurement. In 2025, a benchmark of 3.5% GDP per defense was set to be reached by 2035, with an additional 1.5% allocated towards infrastructure. Many European allies are already surpassing the previous 2% GDP per defense goal, with Germany, the Baltic States, and Poland leading the way in defense spending. Discussions over defense budgets will most likely center around the necessity of forward progress within individual defense plans, but also guaranteeing that commitments expand towards physical capabilities.  

Additionally, this year’s summit will address developments in military and financial support to Ukraine amidst the fourth year of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Countries throughout all of Eastern Europe continue to experience Russian aggression through various mediums, an issue increasingly impacting the security environment of the Baltic States. Under an umbrella of Russia’s malicious forms of power projection over the region, the Baltics’ primary points of discussion will surround enhancements in NATO deterrence and defense initiatives like air policing, as well as strengthening the presence of NATO troops throughout the Eastern flank. The rise of drone incursions in the Baltic States symbolizes a wider threat of Russia’s willingness to challenge NATO member states, and the region is already calling for NATO to heighten its air policing missions into air defense missions. It is likely that the Baltic States will push NATO to redefine its air policing capabilities with more permanent deployments of air defense around the borders. Though the Baltics have proven their commitment to the alliance through notable increases in defense spending, NATO must reflect whether or not the physical defense capabilities already being deployed are sufficient enough against the evolving threat of Russia. 

The Baltic States remain particularly vulnerable to Russian pressure due to their geographic proximity to Russia and their strategic position on NATO’s eastern flank. Russian efforts to undermine the security of NATO member states through both conventional and hybrid tactics are not new, but they take on a renewed significance amid growing uncertainty surrounding the future of U.S. engagement within the alliance. As patterns of financial support and military presence continue to evolve, NATO will most likely discuss the need to adapt elements of its collective defense posture to ensure credible deterrence and regional security. The Baltics remain in a complex threat environment, and alliance fragmentation is a notable issue given the current geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe. 

Main Baltic Security Concerns 

In May of 2026, the Baltic States experienced a rise of drone incursions into their airspace. On May 19th, a drone was shot down over Estonia by a Romanian F-16, and a day after, Lithuanians in capital city Vilnius had to take shelter due to a drone entering into the airspace. On May 25th, a drone crashed into Eastern Latvia, causing an explosion in the Krāslava district. The drones have reportedly been Ukrainian drones, though intercepted and manipulated by Russia and its electronic warfare capabilities. The ability for Russia to disrupt Ukrainian drone patterns and direct them across Baltic borders poses a real threat not only for potential civilian casualties and destruction to infrastructure, but also for influencing rhetoric over the Baltic States’ role within the war. Russia has used the recent drone incursions to spread disinformation, including that the region has opened up its airspace for Ukrainian drones to attack Russia. Russia hopes to destabilize society through a rise in public fear over the war moving across Baltic borders, and the drone sightings have already caused institutional fragmentation throughout the region. 

NATO’s air policing mechanisms against drone incursions have been visible, yet there are key vulnerabilities in NATO’s ability to find cohesion in such missions. Its response to drone sightings are often disorganized, delayed, and situational. This is exacerbated by NATO’s obligation to consult with its members before key decisionmaking, slowing the process of strategic action substantially. Russia understands these vulnerabilities and likely feels empowered to continue provocations against NATO. The alliances’ reactionary response to immediate security threats will only enhance the risks of drone incursions in the Baltic States, and a generalized plan for air policing mechanisms is necessary.  

Russia also poses a withstanding threat on the Baltic States in areas of land and sea. Underwater infrastructure in the Baltic Sea that connects the Baltic States to Northern Europe has been destroyed by Russia’s shadow fleet on multiple occasions. The destruction of undersea data and power cables cause disruptions to regional communication mechanisms, risking power blackouts in the Baltic States and Northern Europe. NATO’s Baltic Sentry Program has increased the presence of the alliance in the Baltic Sea through fleets and air defense, providing enhanced maritime surveillance against Russian sabotage on critical infrastructure. Russia’s influence on the Baltic region takes many forms, but damages to undersea cables and intentional drone incursions aim to destabilize society and challenge NATO’s ability to mobilize cohesion in times of heightened geopolitical tensions.

What Success in Ankara Will Look Like 

With NATO’s goals to increase its defense capabilities in Europe, success at large will revolve around forward progress in defense spending and affirmed member commitments towards 5% of GDP on defense. Cohesion in European defense spending is critical for ensuring that individual member states are prepared militarily and are also prepared to contribute towards collective defense. Renewed security commitments to Ukraine are also necessary. This could come in the form of providing continuous financial support to Ukraine, as well as military armaments and air defense systems. Most notably, however, success for Ukraine will necessitate efforts to maintain the transatlantic alliance between Europe and the United States. Russia needs to be convinced that the alliance can maintain a collective security environment, and any effort on behalf of the United States that builds confidence in its commitment to Europe will be monumental. In other words, avoiding any U.S. escalation towards NATO withdrawal or heightened troop removals in Europe will be seen as a huge step in the right direction for alliance cohesion.  

For the Baltic States, success in Ankara surrounds a renewed security doctrine for how NATO handles immediate threats. Air policing programs in the Baltic States require a more predetermined approach for defense, and NATO can no longer rely on reactionary mechanisms against Russian aggression. This could look like a permanent deployment of air defense systems along NATO’s eastern flank, or at the very least, preestablished agreements over what threats NATO can respond to without ad hoc decision making. A revised plan for air policing would decrease the amount of uncertainty that Russia relies on when pursuing unconventional tactics against Europe. The Baltic States need NATO to shift its focus towards deterrence, strong generalized plans, and greater anticipation for Russian aggression. Not only will this be a means of success for the Baltic region, but all of Europe. NATO’s continuous evolution requires focus over the conventional and hybrid threats that persist in Europe, and maximum success at Ankara will come from reinforcing confidence in the alliance's collective capabilities.